The so-called P5+1 countries have threatened that their ‘patience is running out’ with regards to Iran’s nuclear program. The predicted Security Council vote on new sanctions against Iran came Tuesday, with predictable results: Slight additions to previous sanctions, opposition from Brazil and Turkey and an abstention from Lebanon, and an outburst from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Some commentators, including the Leveretts, lack faith that this fourth round of sanctions will have any serious effect on Iran’s behavior, but the White House, armed with a list of 14 “new” measures imposed by Tuesday’s resolution, argues otherwise.

Here, as best as I can tell, are the noteworthy sanctions that Security Council Resolution 1929 actually imposes:

Forbids states from allowing Iran’s government or citizens to invest in any business related to “uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology … in particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, [and] all heavy-water activities or technology related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”

Forbids states from supplying Iran with “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.” (Commentators have noted that the specific language of this ban excludes the S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which Russia had considered selling to Iran.)

Forbids Iran from engaging in any activity related to ballistic missiles, including test launches, and requires states to take “all necessary measures” to prevent Iran from receiving any technology or assistance related to ballistic missiles.

Requires states to enforce a travel ban, with certain exceptions, against 40 individuals listed in prior resolutions as well as one new addition: Javad Rahiqi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. Previous resolutions had only “called upon” states to “exercise vigilance” about the international travel of certain Iranians involved in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, so Resolution 1929 appears to intensify that travel ban.

Freezes the assets of Javad Rahiqi and 22 Iranian businesses involved in the country’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities, though the majority of the businesses identified are subsidiaries of or connected to other organizations that have already been named in prior resolutions. Resolution 1929 names only one Iranian bank, the First East Export Bank, which is a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, which the Leveretts note has already been targeted by the United States and United Kingdom. The absence of other banks in Resolution 1929 reflects pushback from China and other Security Council members and marks a defeat for the Obama administration, according to the Leveretts.

Freezes the assets of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters and 14 of its subsidiaries, which the resolution alleges are tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The fact that the United States won the inclusion of only one IRGC-connected business in Resolution 1929 marks another defeat in the Leveretts’ view.

Forbids states from supplying, fueling or repairing Iranian-owned or contracted ships if they are suspected of carrying weapons or cargo related to nuclear activities and uranium enrichment.

Freezes the assets of three companies that are owned or act on the behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.

Coming later: What Resolution 1929 does not do, and how the new sanctions affect the overall state of play regarding the Iranian nuclear situation.

After an uncharacteristically restrained response to Israel’s attack on the Gaza flotilla, Iran seems intent on stealing some of Turkey’s thunder.

The Iranian Red Crescent announced late Sunday that two ships carrying humanitarian aid will leave for Gaza “in the coming days.” But the ships won’t actually try to breach Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.

“The aid consists of food and medical supplies, which will be transported into Gaza via the Rafah border in Egypt before the week is through,” said Abdolraoof Adibzadeh, the director of the Iranian Red Crescent.

The Red Crescent is calling for volunteers to accompany the ships, and Adibzadeh said his organization would also send a hospital ship to treat patients in Gaza. It’s unclear whether the ship would anchor in Rafah as well — or whether any of the Iranian volunteers will try to cross into Gaza.

The last Iranian ship sent to Gaza, in early 2009, was turned away by the Israeli navy.

We’ve also heard a lot of speculation that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards would accompany a flotilla to Gaza. Ali Shirazi, one of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s aides in the Guards, told the semi-official Mehr news agency that the IRGC would “escort flotillas to Gaza” if Khamenei ordered it.

But Khamenei hasn’t issued any pronouncements, and Hamas MP Jamal al-Khadri said yesterday (????) that Hamas “doesn’t want any military intervention.”

The headline is sarcastic, of course. But Amitai Etzioni, an Israeli-American professor at George Washington University, is quite serious: He wants the U.S. to threaten a massive bombing campaign (pdf) against Iran in order to derail its nuclear weapons program.

Etzioni’s article was published in the U.S. Army journal Military Review (and it’s already getting favorable reviews in the Israeli press). To call it a superficial and deeply flawed piece of analysis would be charitable.

Etzioni starts by crafting an elaborate straw man — the “champions of deterrence,” a shadowy cabal of academics and op-ed columnists who argue Iran can be contained because they believe all governments act rationally. I call this a straw man because many “champions of deterrence” base their argument on specific observations about Iran, not political science 101.

Case in point: Jeffrey Goldberg — neither a hard-nosed realist nor a dove — has observed repeatedly that the events of the last year demonstrate the Iranian regime’s overarching interest in self-preservation.

Etzioni deploys several logical arguments to refute this straw man — the black swan theory, for instance. But nowhere does he point to specific examples of the Iranian regime’s irrationality. He’s making a probabilistic argument, in other words: Because it’s remotely possible that the Iranian government is acting irrationally, we must treat it as such.

The one exception is this claim, meant to illustrate that the Iranian regime responds positively to overwhelming displays of force:

For instance, by far the most conciliatory offer made by Iran regarding its nuclear program was made in May 2003, after the U.S. military wiped out Saddam’s army within a few weeks with few casualties, something Iran had been unable to do even after an eight-year-long war.

Etzioni’s facts are right, but sorely lacking in context: The Iran-Iraq war ended 15 years prior to the US invasion of Iraq, before a decade of economic sanctions (and the first Gulf War) shattered Iraq’s military-industrial base. “Saddam’s army” in 2003 was a shadow of its former self. What’s more — and this should be axiomatic — the Iranian government would react differently to a U.S. invasion of Iran than it did to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Etzioni then goes on to claim that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would shred the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and drive Japan, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina to develop nuclear weapons. Want proof? Too bad; he doesn’t cite any. It’s just something he knows.

All of this builds up to Etzioni’s main conclusion:

… the next step would entail bombing of Iran’s nonnuclear military assets (such as the headquarters and encampments of the Revolutionary Guard, air defense installations and radar sites, missile sites, and naval vessels that might be used against oil shipments). If such bombing does not elicit the required response, the bombing of select dual-use assets will be undertaken, including key elements of the infrastructure, like bridges, railroad stations, and other such assets, just the way the U.S. did in Germany and Japan in World War II.

Let’s ignore the fact that such a bombing campaign would be illegal, that it would overwhelmingly hurt Iran’s civilian population, and that it would probably cement the regime’s control over the country (here, parallels to the Iran-Iraq war are instructive).

But let’s put all that aside and focus on the strategic impact. If we apply Etzioni’s framework, two possible scenarios xplain why the Iranian regime is pursuing a nuclear program. There’s the “rational-actor scenario,” in which Tehran is motivated by some combination of military deterrence, regional geopolitics and domestic diversionary tactics. And there’s the “messianic scenario,” in which Tehran plans to nuke Tel Aviv or smuggle a nuclear weapon into an American port.

In either case — how does carpet-bombing Tehran address the underlying problem? If the regime is truly messianic, it won’t care about damage to civilian infrastructure, because it’s not interested in self-preservation.

As for the realist scenario: Etzioni himself notes that even the reformists in the Iranian government support the nuclear program. If the program is viewed as a military deterrent, a bombing campaign will only reinforce the regime’s belief that such a deterrent is necessary.

I’ll stop now, because I’ve already wasted too many words on this subject. But suffice it to say I’m continually amazed — given the lessons of Iraq, given all the compelling arguments against bombing Iran — that the idea continues to merit such sustained attention in respectable publications (and particularly when it’s advocated in such poorly-thought out articles).